It is common for a retailer to sell products from competing manufacturers. How then should the …rms manage their contract negotiations? The supply chain coordination literature focuses either on a single manufacturer selling to a single retailer or one manufacturer selling to many (possibly competing) retailers. We …nd that some key conclusions from those market structures do not apply in our setting. We allow the manufacturers to compete for the retailer's business using one of three types of contracts, a wholesale-price contract, a quantity-discount contract or a two-part tari¤. It is well known that there are two reasons why a monopolist manufacturer prefers either of the latter two, more sophisticated, contracts relative to the wholesale-price contract. First, they can be used to coordinate the supply chain, meaning that they induce the retailer to sell more because they reduce the double marginalization caused by wholesale-price contracts. Second, they can be used to extract rents from the retailer, in theory allowing the manufacturer to leave the retailer only with her reservation pro…t. However, we show that in our market structure these two sophisticated contracts force the manufacturers to compete more aggressively than when they only o¤er wholesale-price contracts, and this may leave them worse o¤ and the retailer substantially better o¤. In other words, although in a serial supply chain a retailer may have just cause to fear quantity discounts and two-part tari¤s, a retailer may actually prefer those contracts when o¤ered by competing manufacturers. We conclude that the properties a contractual form exhibits in a one-manufacturer supply chain may not carry over to the realistic setting in which multiple manufacturers must compete to sell their goods through a single retailer. 1 The authors would like to thank Awi Federgruen, Leslie Marx and Richard Staelin for helpful discussions.
Introduction
The literature on supply chain coordination has studied several contractual forms in settings with a single manufacturer and one or more retailers. One of the key results from this literature is that wholesale-price contracts lead to suboptimal decisions for the supply chain (i.e., double marginalization) and more sophisticated contracts (like quantity discounts or two-part tari¤s) can be employed to achieve both channel coordination (i.e., maximize the supply chain's pro…t) and rent extraction (i.e., the ability to allocate a high share of the pro…ts to the manufacturer). Our objective in this paper is to test this conclusion in a setting in which multiple manufacturers compete to sell their products through a single retailer.
In our model, two manufacturers simultaneously o¤er to the retailer one of three types of contracts: a wholesale-price contract, a quantity-discount contract (i.e., a decreasing per-unit price in the quantity purchased) or a two-part tari¤ (i.e., a per unit price and a …xed fee). The retailer's prices determine the products'demand rates, and she sets her prices to maximize her total pro…t given the o¤ered contracts and her inventory costs, which may exhibit economies of scale. The model setting represents one of the most common supply chain structures, as many manufacturers sell their products through retailers that also sell products of other manufacturers. A typical example is Procter&Gamble's Crest versus Colgate in the toothpaste category at a supermarket.
As with all supply chain structures, the …rms are indirectly interested in the total pro…t in the supply chain, and more directly interested in their share of that pro…t. In supply chains with a monopolist manufacturer it has been shown that a properly designed quantity-discount or two-part tari¤ allows the manufacturer to maximize his product's total pro…t (i.e., the two …rms' combined pro…t). Furthermore, the manufacturer can extract the largest possible share of that pro…t, thereby leaving the retailer with her reservation pro…t, which is the pro…t the retailer can earn if the retailer rejects the contract. In a serial supply chain the retailer's reservation pro…t is assumed to be an exogenous constant that re ‡ects the retailer's bargaining power -an increase in the retailer's bargaining power is modeled by increasing the retailer's reservation pro…t. However, in our structure with two manufacturers, the retailer's reservation pro…t is endogenous -the pro…t the retailer can earn if it were to reject manufacturer A's o¤er depends on what manufacturer B o¤ers, and vice-versa. This distinction is signi…cant and, as we demonstrate, important for our …ndings.
We show that, holding the other manufacturer's contract o¤er …xed, a manufacturer can increase its pro…t by using a more sophisticated contract relative to a wholesale-price contract. Furthermore, in equilibrium (i.e., a pair of contracts such that neither manufacturer has an incentive to o¤er a different contract given the other manufacturer's contract o¤er), we show that the more sophisticated contracts can increase the supply chain's total pro…t, again relative to the wholesale-price contract.
These results are analogous to those found in models with a monopolist manufacturer. However, in sharp contrast to the results with one manufacturer, we also …nd that in equilibrium, if the products are close substitutes, the manufacturers may earn substantially less when sophisticated contracts are o¤ered and the retailer may earn substantially more.
In a one-manufacturer setting sophisticated contracts are advantageous to the manufacturer because they allow the manufacturer to increase and extract rents. These abilities are present even with multiple manufacturers (holding the other manufacturer's contract …xed), but now there is an additional e¤ect -the sophisticated contracts also yield more aggressive competition between the manufacturers. This additional e¤ect may dominate the others -quantity discounts and twopart tari¤s e¤ectively increase the retailer's bargaining power relative to wholesale-price contracts, so much so that the manufacturers can be worse o¤ with them relative to an equilibrium in which they both o¤er wholesale-price contracts. To explain further, in our multiple-manufacturer model the retailer's reservation pro…t is endogenous and competition between the manufacturers serves to raise it, in particular when sophisticated contracts are used.
The comparison of equilibrium pro…ts in this setting with two competing manufacturers and a common retailer leads to additional insights on contracting that are di¤erent from those in a serial supply chain and those in two competing supply chains with dedicated retailers (as in McGuire and Staelin, 1983) . In those settings, two-part tari¤ and quantity-discount contracts are equivalent from the perspective of the manufacturers and the retailer, and the retailer always prefers the wholesale-price contracts. In our setting, the manufacturers always prefer two-part tari¤s to quantity discounts. The retailer prefers aggressive quantity discounts to two-part tari¤s, and prefers the wholesale-price contract to both when the products are close substitutes. While the retailer's contract preferences are the reverse of the manufacturers'for low and high substitutability cases, all …rms prefer the more sophisticated contracts to wholesale-price contracts for a range of medium substitutability because the increase in supply chain pro…t dominates the e¤ects of competition and rent extraction.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 present our analysis of the retailer's problem, Section 5 the analysis and comparison of the wholesale-price, quantity-discount and two-part tari¤ games, and Section 6 the numerical study. Section 7 concludes the paper. All proofs are presented in the Appendix.
Relation to Literature
The present paper is foremost a commentary on the supply chain coordination literature (see Cachon 2003 for a review). As already discussed, this literature focuses on either relationships with bilateral monopoly or models with one manufacturer and multiple retailers. Wholesale-price contracts are nearly always found to be ine¢ cient and more sophisticated contracts can be used to eliminate that ine¢ ciency and reallocate rents arbitrarily between the parties in the supply chain. 2 There is an extensive literature on supply chain coordination with quantity-discount contracts and price-dependent demand (e.g., Jeuland and Shugan 1983 , Moorthy 1987 , Ingene and Perry 1995 and on lot-size coordination with …xed demand (e.g., Monahan 1984, Corbett and de Groote 2000) , but they consider only one manufacturer. Choi (1991) , Trivedi (1998) , Lee and Staelin (1997) , and Martinez de Albeniz and Roels (2007) study systems with multiple manufacturers and a common retailer, but they only consider wholesale-price contracts. The literature on vertical separation in economics is also relevant as they study models with multiple manufacturers and retailers that could sell more than one product. Mathewson and Winter (1987) explore whether or not exclusive dealing arrangements lead to foreclosure of rivals and the implications for anti-trust laws considering only wholesale-price contracts. Bernheim and Whinston (1998 ) and O'Brien and Sha¤er (1993 explore similar issues with two-part tari¤s. Other variations of the basic model include manufacturers that invest in the retailers to reduce the marginal selling cost (Besanko and Perry, 1994) and manufacturers 2 A wholesale-price contract can maximize pro…ts in a system with one manufacturer and multiple quantity competing retailers. However, it provides only one allocation of the system's rents and it isn't even the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price (see Cachon and Lariviere 2005) . If retailers compete on price and quantity, then the wholesale price no longer guarantees coordination (see Federgruen 2003, 2005) . that assign exclusive territories to retailers to reduce competition (Rey and Stiglitz, 1995) . The general result is that the manufacturers may prefer exclusive dealing due to reduced competition at the retailer level even though societal welfare and industry pro…ts may be higher with common agency. This is essentially a comparison of di¤erent supply chain structures, whereas we are concerned with the e¤ect of di¤erent contract types in a given supply chain structure. Also related to two-part tari¤s, there is a literature on slotting fees (which are essentially two-part tari¤s with negative payments to the manufacturer, see, for example, Marx and Sha¤er 2004) . Kuksov and Pazgal (2007) show that slotting fees do not occur in a setting with simultaneous manufacturer competition and a single retailer, and the same result applies in our model.
The literature on strategic decentralization in marketing is highly relevant. McGuire and Staelin (1983) study two competing supply chains under two structural forms: in each supply chain either the manufacturer sells to a dedicated retailer via a wholesale-price contract or the manufacturer vertically integrates into retailing. In either structure the products of the two manufacturers are sold to consumers from di¤erent …rms, whereas in our model the manufacturers'products are sold through a single independent retailer. Nevertheless, there are some similarities in our results. McGuire and Staelin (1983) …nd that the manufacturers may prefer to sell via wholesale-price contracts, despite the fact that they do not coordinate the channel nor allow the manufacturer to extract all rents, because they dampen retail competition between the two products relative to the vertically integrated structure. In our model, competition to consumers is held constant, because we have a single retailer, so what changes is the retailer's bargaining power relative to the manufacturers. Coughlan (1985) con…rms the McGuire and Staelin …ndings in an empirical study of the international semiconductor industry. In the context of the McGuire and Staelin model, Moorthy (1988) provides conditions on the characteristics of the game and the demand function for decentralization to be an equilibrium strategy and Bonanno and Vickers (1988) show that decentralization is always the equilibrium when both manufacturers employ two-part tari¤s. In a di¤erent context with strategic consumers timing their purchase of a product, Desai et al. (2004) and Arya and Mittendorf (2006) consider a monopolist manufacturer and show that decentralization through wholesale-price contracts can yield higher pro…ts for the channel.
The Model
There are two products in the market supplied by two di¤erent manufacturers. The products are partial substitutes and are sold through a common retailer. In the …rst stage of the game, the manufacturers simultaneously announce the payment schemes for their products. In the second stage, the retailer chooses prices, which determine the products' demand rates, to maximize her pro…t. In addition to the payments to the manufacturer, the retailer incurs operating costs that depend on the average volume sold of each product. The manufacturers incur constant marginal production costs.
The retailer faces price sensitive customers. The revenue from product i is
where d i is the demand rate of product i; d is the pair of demand rates, and the inverse demand function is
We elect to work with the inverse demand function for expositional simplicity. The formulation with the demand function is equivalent to the above.
be the retailer's inventory related operational costs of product i,
where K i and are exogenous constants. This functional form, which exhibits economies of scale, is a general representation of the inventory costs that arise in common inventory replenishment models such as a base-stock model 3 or an economic order quantity model 4 .
Let i denote the retailer's pro…t from product i and = i + j , the retailer's total pro…t. It
In a periodic review model where demand follows a Normal distribution with mean di and standard deviation id i , the total inventory related costs with the optimal base-stock level is given by (b + h) (z ) id i ; where b is the backlog penalty per unit, and h is the inventory holding cost per period. De…ning Ki = (b + h) (z ) i leads to the Gi function. 4 In the economic order quantity (EOQ) model, the retailer incurs a …xed cost ki per order and a holding cost hi per unit of inventory held for one period. The well known EOQ formula suggests ordering every p 2ki=hidi periods. The resulting optimal inventory and ordering costs is given by p 2kidihi: De…ning Ki = p 2kihi leads to the Gi function with = 1=2. and T i (d i ) is the payment made to the manufacturer based on the retailer's demand rate and their agreed upon contract. 5 Manufacturer i's pro…t is
where c i is the manufacturer's cost per unit.
We consider three di¤erent types of contracts. With a wholesale-price contract, the payment function is
where w i is the wholesale price chosen by manufacturer i.
We include the following set of quantity-discount contracts:
where w i is a ‡exible parameter chosen by the manufacturer, c i is the manufacturer's marginal cost per unit, and v i is an exogenous constant, where v i 2 [0; v) and v = 2 i i + j : We have intentionally designed this set of quantity-discount contracts such that (1) they have a single parameter, just like the wholesale-price contract, w i , and (2) wholesale-price contracts are a subset of our quantity-discount contracts -a quantity discount with v i = 0 is a wholesale-price contract.
Although we only consider a subset of possible quantity discounts, this is not overly restrictive.
Our quantity discounts are continuous, di¤erentiable, concave, and the manufacturer does not sell even the marginal unit for less than its production cost. The bound on v i implies that the quantity-discount is not too "aggressive" in the sense that the marginal price paid does not fall too rapidly as the purchase volume increases, i.e., T 00
In fact, it can be shown that our quantity discounts are optimal for the manufacturer (holding the other manufacturer's contract o¤er …xed) among all concave and increasing payment functions given the T 00 for the most aggressive contract, the two-part tari¤.
As already mentioned, our third contract form is the two-part tari¤, which is characterized by a …xed fee F i and a marginal cost w i :
where indicator function
A symmetric game across manufacturers means that the data for the two products are identical, i.e., c i , i ; i , i ; K i ; v i are the same for any i: The subscript i will be dropped in those cases. In a symmetric solution, the decisions (d i at the retail level, w i or T i at the manufacturer level) are identical across products.
In the following sections, we solve the problem using backward induction. We analyze the retailer's decision …rst and then the game between the manufacturers.
The Retailer' s Problem
In the …rst stage of the game, the manufacturers simultaneously announce their contract o¤ers. We assume that the particular contractual form o¤ered is established before the game begins, but we later discuss what happens when the manufacturers choose their contractual form and parameters simultaneously. In the second stage, given functions T 1 and T 2 ; the retailer chooses the demand rates to maximize her pro…t. 6 We provide a numerical example in which there exists no equilibrium. In the example = 20; = 2; = 1; c = 1; and v = 2 ( ), we get cycling, because manufacturer 1's best response is w1(w2) = fw2 "; if w2 7:75; 8:10, otherwiseg where " is a small positive constant. 7 The marginal cost under a quantity discount contract (2) is given by Ti(di) = fwi vidi; if di (wi ci) =vi; ci; otherwiseg: As vi ! 1; Ti(di) = fwi; if di = 0; ci; if di > 0g ; which has the same shape as the marginal cost under a two-part tari¤ contract.
We present the analysis assuming that the manufacturers o¤er the retailer quantity discounts, which, as discussed earlier, are wholesale-price contracts when v i = 0: The analysis of the retailer's problem under two-part tari¤s is similar to that under the wholesale-price contracts. De…ne
The retailer's optimization problem can now be written as
Hence, the optimal solution to the retailer's problem is
For expositional simplicity, we assume the retailer breaks ties in favor of carrying a full product line over a single product.
Consider the problem of maximizing total supply chain pro…t. It is equivalent to the retailer's problem if the manufacturers charge only their production cost.
These pro…t levels are respectively the maximum pro…t the system earns, if it were to carry only product 1, only product 2 and both products. We assume^
which implies that it is always optimal for the system to carry both products. Now return to the system with independent manufacturers and a retailer. Let H i denote the …rst derivative of with respect to d i . We have
Consider …rst the case with no economies of scale (i.e., The case with economies of scale, however, is rather complicated. Observe that The next theorem shows that there can be at most one interior local maximum and that the optimal solution is either that interior solution or at one of the boundary lines. That is, there are at most three candidate optimal solutions and each is characterized by a set of …rst order conditions.
Furthermore, in a symmetric problem, the unique interior maximum is a symmetric solution.
the unique interior optimal solution to fH i = 0; i = 1; 2g and d i (0) is given by the larger of the two solutions to
, whered is the larger of the two solutions to
In summary, there are at most three local maxima for a retailer's problem: one interior solution in which the retailer carries both products, and two boundary solutions in which the retailer carries only one product.
While the retailer's pro…t function is generally complex in the presence of economies of scale, the following conditions ensure that it is jointly concave in (d 1 ; d 2 ). We state and prove this result in Lemma 1 in the Appendix.
The condition (10) requires the own-and cross-price coe¢ cients to be symmetric. This is not a very restrictive assumption, because we allow nonidentical i ; which implies di¤erent demand rates and price elasticities for the products. The condition (11) is stricter than our earlier assumption: it requires the quantity discount to be less concave to guarantee the concavity of the retailer's pro…t function. The condition (12) stipulates that the own-price elasticity (" ii ) is less than two times the revenues-to-average inventory costs ratio of the product. (It is similar to the conditions Bernstein and Federgruen (2003) developed for decentralized retailers and as they point out the conditions hold for most retailers based on the industry data in Dun and Bradstreet (2006) and Tellis (1988) ).
Manufacturers'Problem
In this section, we analyze the game between the manufacturers which o¤er quantity discounts (possibly with v i = 0) or two-part tari¤s to the retailer. First, we de…ne the game and make some initial observations. We then characterize the equilibria under quantity discounts and two-part tari¤s in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, respectively, and compare the equilibria in Section 5.3 for a special case of the problem.
Each manufacturer chooses its own best response T i (T j ) given the other manufacturer's contract o¤er T j .
An equilibrium of the game is a pair of contracts (T i ; T j ) such that neither manufacturer has an incentive to o¤er a di¤erent contract.
The following remark demonstrates how the contracting problem with multiple manufacturers is di¤erent from that with a single manufacturer.
Remark 1 For any …xed contract o¤ ered by manufacturer 2 such that 2 (0; d 2 (0)) > 0 :
1. Consider the set of contracts such that the retailer's payment to manufacturer 1 is a nondecreasing function of d 1 : There does not exist a contract in this set such that the manufacturer can extract all of the pro…t from his product (i.e., it is not possible to have 1 > 0 and
2. The retailer accepts manufacturer 1's contract o¤ er and stocks both products only if
Unlike in a serial supply chain, the …rst statement implies that a manufacturer must leave the retailer with some pro…t to induce the retailer to carry the manufacturer's product (see the Appendix for a detailed proof). In other words, the retailer's reservation pro…t for carrying a product is greater than zero. However, this does not mean that a single reservation pro…t exists.
The second statement provides an intuitive condition, (14), for when the retailer is willing to carry manufacturer 1's product -the retailer must earn more with product 1 in the assortment than without product 1 in the assortment. The right hand side of (14) can be considered the retailer's reservation pro…t that the retailer must earn from product 1 for the retailer to be willing to carry product 1. The …rst term, 2 (0; d 2 (0)); is …xed, given manufacturer 2's contract o¤er. However, the second term, 2 (d i ;d j ); depends on manufacturer 1's contract o¤er and it decreases if 1 (
is increasing, making it more di¢ cult for the manufacturer to make its o¤er attractive. Therefore, even if manufacturer 2's contract o¤er is held …xed, there does not exist a reservation pro…t for product 1 that is independent of manufacturer 1's contract o¤er, as is assumed in models with a single manufacturer. Put another way, a serial supply chain with a …xed reservation pro…t for the retailer cannot replicate the dynamics of our model.
It remains to characterize the equilibrium contract o¤ers by the manufacturers. We start with the following observation that rules out equilibria in which the retailer carries only one product in symmetric games.
Remark 2 In a symmetric game, there does not exist a manufacturer equilibrium where
The result is due to (8), which guarantees that the inclusion of a manufacturer strictly increases system pro…t. Suppose there were an equilibrium in which manufacturer i is excluded. Regardless of the fraction of^ j the retailer earns, manufacturer i can o¤er to sell to the retailer at c i + " for an arbitrarily small " and then the retailer's pro…t increases if it carries product i: If j is excluded as a result, it will react similarly and be included.
Wholesale-Price and Quantity-Discount Contracts
In this section, we partially characterize the equilibrium of the game under quantity-discount and wholesale-price contracts. In the presence of economies of scale (i.e., if K i > 0 for any i), we assume that conditions (10)- (11) hold and we restrict our attention to a region de…ned by (12). De…ne
, the maximum w i that makes the retailer exclude product j and w i (w j ) = minfw i : d i (w i ; w j ) = 0g, the minimum wholesale price of i that makes the retailer exclude product i: Note that w i (w j ) may not exist for every w j : In that case, set w i (w j ) = c i :
De…ne w i (w j ) as the best response of manufacturer i, which can be found via a line-search between
The following theorem characterizes the unique symmetric equilibrium of the contract o¤er game.
Theorem 2 Consider a symmetric game in which the manufacturers o¤ er quantity discounts.
There exists a unique symmetric solution to
denoted (w 1 ; w 2 ); which is the unique candidate to be a symmetric equilibrium.
As can be seen in the proof of the above theorem, showing the unimodality of a manufacturer's pro…t in w i requires the use of the second-order properties of the retailer's optimal solution
The analysis of a manufacturer game that is built on the solution of a complex problem at the retailer presents technical di¢ culties in the presence of economies of scale, that have not been present in any other competition paper in the literature.
We cannot guarantee that the candidate point described in Theorem 2 is an equilibrium. We show that at (w 1 ; w 2 ) ; w i is a local optimum for manufacturer i, and i is concave for w i > w i : However, the optimal solution w i (w j ) may be di¤erent than w i in the range [w i ; w i ] : If w i (w j ) = w i ; then (w 1 ; w 2 ) is indeed an equilibrium point. If not, there there exists no symmetric equilibrium. Now consider the situation in which there are no economies of scale. This substantially simpli…es the analysis of both the retailer's demand decisions and the manufacturers' contract o¤er problem. For any (v 1 ; v 2 ) and asymmetric products, we can now guarantee joint concavity of the retailer's pro…t and the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium without the symmetry assumptions. The next theorem provides the closed form solutions for the demand rates and the contract parameters by solving the …rst-order conditions given in Theorem 2.
Theorem 3 With no economies of scale (i.e., K i = 0); there exists a unique equilibrium of the game in which the manufacturers o¤ er quantity discounts. It is characterized by the following reaction functions and the optimal demand rates:
where
In this section we have assumed that the manufacturers o¤er quantity discounts with an exogenously speci…ed v i : Suppose the manufacturers now simultaneously o¤er a (w i ; v i ) where they are
In other words, they can choose to o¤er a wholesaleprice contract (v i = 0) or a quantity discount (v i > 0): The next proposition indicates, as in supply chains with a single manufacturer, that a manufacturer prefers to o¤er a quantity-discount contract and, in particular, prefers more aggressive quantity discounts. Quantity discounts allow the manufacturer to increase supply chain rents (i.e., reduce double marginalization) and to extract rents, so they are the preferred contract when the other manufacturer's contract is held …xed even when the retailer can adjust its demand allocations between the two products in response.
Proposition 1 Manufacturer i's pro…t strictly increases with v i at the optimal w i . That is, if a manufacturer is given the option to choose between three contractual forms with v i 2 f0; a; bg such
The immediate implication of this proposition is that if the manufacturers endogenously choose the quadratic parameter of their quantity discount as well as the starting wholesale price, each manufacturer's best response is to choose the most aggressive contract allowed in the system.
The next corollary states that any equilibrium of this game would then have the most aggressive contracts by both manufacturers.
Corollary 1 In the contract choice game in which the manufacturers simultaneously o¤ er (w i ; v i ) and they are free to choose any v i 2 [0;v] for somev < v; the equilibrium contracts are such that v i =v for both manufacturers.
This does not mean however, that the manufacturers are better o¤ at this equilibrium under quantity discounts than the equilibrium under wholesale-price contracts. Table 1 provides a numerical example to compare the equilibrium solution when the manufacturers o¤er wholesale-price and quantity-discount contracts for i = 20, i = 2, i = 1, c i = 1, K i = 0 for all i; and v 1 = v 2 = 1:6 when quantity discounts are o¤ered.
Wholesale price 0 0 7.33 7.33 2.11 2.11 26.74 13.37 13.37 Quantity discounts 1.6 1.6 7.59 7.59 2.82 2.82 35.02 12.22 12.22 Table 1 : Equilibrium contract parameters, demand rate, and pro…ts under wholesale-price and quantity-discount contracts.
Recall that a manufacturer prefers to o¤er a quantity discount for any …xed contract o¤er by the other manufacturer. However, this preference does not carry over to the equilibrium analysis.
Competition between the manufacturers is di¤erent when they both o¤er quantity discounts than when they both o¤er wholesale-price contracts. Apparently, it can be a more aggressive type of competition. Note, the supply chain is better o¤ with quantity-discounts -as in a supply chain with a monopolist manufacturer, quantity discounts improve supply chain e¢ ciency. However, in this example, the retailer captures all of the improved e¢ ciency and even more, leaving the manufacturers worse o¤. This need not always be true, as we demonstrate in Sections 5.3 and 6.
Two-Part Tari¤s
In this section, we consider the game between manufacturers that o¤er two-part tari¤ contracts.
Several papers in the industrial organization literature (e.g., Bernheim and Whinston, 1998 ) provide a characterization of the equilibrium with two-part tari¤s. The next theorem generalizes this characterization to the case with economies of scale at the retailer.
Theorem 4 Given any contract by manufacturer j; the optimal contract of manufacturer i is a two-part tari¤ contract of the type (F i ; c i ) : The equilibrium of the two-part tari¤ game is given by F i =^ 12 ^ j for i = 1; 2; j = 3 i. Hence, i =^ 12 ^ j and =^ 1 +^ 2 ^ 12 :
As can be seen in the proof of the theorem, showing the optimality of a two-part tari¤ in the presence of economies of scale requires checking the boundary solutions of the multi-modal retail pro…t function so that its product does not get dropped when a manufacturer changes its contract.
The …rst result states that the optimal contract for a manufacturer is to set the variable cost equal to the marginal production cost, thereby making a pro…t exclusively from the …xed fee, i = F i :
The second part of the theorem states that in equilibrium each manufacturer charges a …xed fee that equals exactly the incremental bene…t it brings to the whole system. Overall, just as we have shown that a manufacturer prefers quantity discounts to wholesale-price contracts for a …xed contract o¤er from the other manufacturer (Proposition 1), Theorem 4 indicates that two-part tari¤s are a dominant strategy for the manufacturer over all contracts -a manufacturer prefers the more aggressive two-part tari¤s over a wholesale-price contract.
When the manufacturers o¤er two-part tari¤s, the retailer chooses system optimal pricing and ordering decisions (because the manufacturers'per unit prices equal their marginal costs). Hence, the system's pro…t is maximized and the allocation of that pro…t is determined by the …xed fees.
System pro…ts are not always maximized when the manufacturers o¤er wholesale-price or quantitydiscount contracts.
Although the manufacturers are able to extract rent more e¤ectively with two-part tari¤s than with quantity-discounts, they cannot extract all of the pro…t from their product. The retailer gains considerable power when she retains stocking and pricing decision rights and the manufacturers compete. Especially when the products are close substitutes,^ 12 is not much higher than^ 1 or 2 : Thus, in that case, the retailer captures a large part of the total pro…t and each manufacturer gets only^ 12 ^ i ; which is relatively small.
Comparison of the Equilibria for a Special Case
In this section, we consider a special case, a system with symmetric products (i.e., identical i ; i ; i ; c i ; v i ) and no economies of scale at the retailer (i.e., K i = 0); in order to fully characterize and compare the equilibria under all three contract types. We present a numerical study for the general case in the next section, which provides results similar to the results obtained here.
In this case, Theorem 1 guarantees a unique equilibrium for the quantity-discount game for all
) ; there may exist no equilibrium.) We are not able to analytically compare the wholesale-price equilibrium (i.e., v = 0) with the equilibrium under a quantity discount for arbitrary v; but we can make this comparison at the limit as v goes to 2 ( ). The limit case can be interpreted as the equilibrium outcome if the manufacturers can endogenously choose (w; v)
as contract parameters, because Corollary 1 states that both manufacturers'will choose the most aggressive quantity discounts at equilibrium. As we shall see next, the equilibrium of the game with this most aggressive quantity discount achieves the supply chain optimal solution. Table 2 presents the equilibrium pro…t terms under the three contract types. The derivation of the pro…t expressions are provided in the Appendix.
Wholesale price
Table 2: Equilibrium pro…ts under wholesale-price, quantity-discount, and two-part tari¤ contracts in the case with symmetric products and no economies of scale.
From the supply chain perspective, the limiting quantity-discount and two-part tari¤ equilibria result in supply chain optimal pro…ts, while wholesale-price equilibrium does not. This is consistent with the results for supply chains with a single manufacturer. Other quantity-discount equilibria with v < 2 ( ) ; however, may not result in supply chain optimal pro…ts as we shall see in the numerical study.
The next theorem compares the manufacturers'pro…ts under the three contract types. Even though quantity discounts and two-part tari¤s are the dominant strategies over the wholesale-price contracts, the manufacturers may be worse o¤ in equilibrium with quantity-discounts and two-part tari¤s relative to wholesale-price contracts.
Theorem 5 (Manufacturers'Perspective) (i)The manufacturers pro…ts are always higher under two-part tari¤ s than quantity-discount contracts.
(ii) The manufacturers pro…ts are higher un-der quantity discounts than wholesale-price contracts if and only if < 3
The manufacturers pro…ts are higher under two-part tari¤ s than wholesale-price contracts if and only if < 2 p 2 (0:586) :
Manufacturer pro…ts are always higher with two-part tari¤s than quantity discounts because they both yield the same supply chain optimal price levels at equilibrium, but two-part tari¤s are more e¤ective in rent extraction. This is di¤erent from the cases of a serial supply chain and two competing supply chains with dedicated retailers, where the two contract forms are equivalent. Comparing these contracts with the wholesale-price contracts is nontrivial. If the products are highly substitutable, the manufacturers' pro…ts are lower under two-part tari¤s and quantity discounts than wholesale-price contracts because they compete more aggressively with these con- The retailer always prefers quantity-discount contracts to two-part tari¤s because they are equally e¢ cient from a system perspective, but quantity discounts are less e¤ective in rent extraction from the retailer. The second and third parts of the theorem state that the retailer's pro…t is lower under two-part tari¤ and quantity-discount contracts only if the product substitutability is very low. For a wide range of ; the retailer is better o¤ with quantity discounts and two-part tari¤s.
These results are di¤erent from the cases of a serial supply chain and two competing supply chains with dedicated retailers, where the two-part tari¤ and quantity-discount contracts are equivalent and the retailer always prefers the wholesale-price contracts to both of them. In the extreme case of independent products, i.e., = 0, the retailer's pro…t is zero with a quantity discount or a two-part tari¤, because there is no competition and each manufacturer is able to extract all the pro…t with sophisticated contracts. These results demonstrate that the root cause of the retailer's power is product substitutability.
We do not assign the retailer the power to dictate contract terms, yet with highly substitutable products the retailer earns a larger share of the total pro…t due to quantity or pricing decision rights.
The retailer even prefers the more aggressive contract types when products are close substitutes, because the bene…ts of more intense competition dominates the disadvantage of the rent extraction by the manufacturers. Figure 1 illustrates the manufacturers'and the retailer's contract preferences for di¤erent levels of substitutability. While the contract preference of the retailer is the reverse of the manufacturers' for low and high substitutability cases, for a range of medium substitutability, all players prefer the more sophisticated contracts to wholesale-price contracts, as the increase in supply chain pro…t dominates the e¤ects of the competition and rent extraction. These results have implications on which contractual forms could be observed in practice, depending on who determines the contract forms in a supply chain and the level of substitutability between products.
Complementary Products
Two products are complements if the demand rate of one increases with the consumption of the other. Complementary products can be included in our model by allowing the cross-elasticity parameter to be negative. In this section, we brie ‡y describe what elements of the above analysis and results apply in the case with complementary products. The analysis of the retailer's problem remains the same, with the technical stipulation that the quadratic parameter of the quantity discounts v i must be chosen from [0; 2 ( + )) for joint concavity of the retail pro…t function. More importantly, the nature of the game between the manufacturers changes with complementary products. The manufacturers are no longer in competition and would like the other to sell as much as possible. This leads to the decreasing best response functions w i (w j ) as can be seen from the expression given in Theorem 3. The equilibrium solutions given in Table   2 no longer apply for the limiting quantity discount and two-part tari¤ cases. Evaluating the pro…t functions as v goes to 2 ( + ) for the special case considered above, we …nd that the manufacturer pro…ts are equal to the supply chain optimal, ( c) 2 =2 ( + ) ; and the retailer's pro…t is zero. There are multiple equilibria in the two-part tari¤ game where the payo¤s are
; or a linear combination of these points. For the special case,
, and the quantity-discount equilibrium is the midpoint of the continuum of the equilibria of the two-part tari¤ game. These results are formally stated and proved in Theorem 7 in the Appendix. In summary, without substitutability, the retailer has no power, because it can no longer play the two manufacturers o¤ of each other.
Both the most aggressive quantity discounts and two-part tari¤s achieve coordination as well as full rent extraction.
Numerical Study
This section presents numerical examples comparing the equilibrium solution when the manufacturers o¤er wholesale-price, quantity-discount and two-part tari¤ contracts. We start with exploring the e¤ect of the quadratic parameter of the quantity-discount contracts on manufacturer pro…ts.
Recall the example in Table 1 , in which the manufacturers are worse o¤ under quantity discounts with v = 1:6 than wholesale-price contracts. Figure 2 (a) plots the change in the manufacturers' pro…t for that example as v varies from zero to 2 ( ). As v decreases from 1.6 to 0.4, then the manufacturers are better o¤ o¤ering quantity discounts than wholesale-price contracts -in this case the manufacturer competition has not been intensi…ed substantially, allowing them to increase their pro…t. However, if the products become more substitutable (lower or higher ), then the manufacturers are worse o¤ with quantity-discounts no matter how weak the quantity discounts are (i.e., no matter how low v is). On the other hand, with less substitutable products (lower ) the manufacturers bene…t from quantity discounts at equilibrium. Figure 2(b) shows that including inventory costs can make the negative e¤ects of competition with quantity discounts on the manufacturers'pro…ts more pronounced. This is because a higher level of economies of scale makes the retailer more sensitive to the manufacturer o¤ers in making the quantity decisions, and in e¤ect increases the retailer's power in the system. We constructed a numerical study to better understand the extent of these observations. We chose parameters from the following sets, leading to 144 scenarios: = f20; 40g; = f1; 2; 4g; = f0:25; 0:5; 0:75; 0:25g ; c = f1; 3g; K = f0; 1; 3g : We evaluate each scenario under wholesale-price, quantity-discount, and two-part tari¤ contracts. For quantity-discount contracts, we set v = f0; 0:5; 0:95; 1:8g ( j j) if K = 0 and v = f0; 0:5; 0:95g (
This leads to a total of 672 instances. In eight of the 144 scenarios, we haven't been able to …nd an equilibrium for at least one of the contracts (including the wholesale-price contracts in …ve scenarios). Investigating the best response functions in those cases reveals that the e¤ect of the economies of scale is very strong at the retailer and the manufacturers cycle between undercutting prices to get the retailer to exclude the other manufacturer and being undercut. In those cases, there does not exist an asymmetric equilibrium either. We report the results for the remaining 136 scenarios. As a validity check, we compare the average cost per unit that the retailer pays to the manufacturers, T (d)=d; with the two types of contracts: the average cost is 5% lower in the quantity discounts equilibrium than the wholesale prices when v = 0:5 ( j j) and 11% lower when v = 0:95 ( j j) ; which indicates that the quantity discounts in equilibrium in these examples are modest. Table 3 provides a summary of the comparison of pro…ts relative to the wholesale-price equilibrium. From the supply chain perspective, the total pro…t increases in all cases when quantity discounts or two-part tari¤s are o¤ered. This is of course expected for two-part tari¤s, because they achieve system coordination. Quantity discounts on the other hand achieve coordination only at the extreme case as v goes to the limit. The total pro…t under quantity-discount contracts get closer to the supply chain optimal as v increases and is almost as good as two-part tari¤s when v = 1:8 . The percentage increase in total pro…t decreases as product substitutability increases, because the ine¢ ciency of the system under wholesale-price contracts decreases with higher .
For the retailer and manufacturer pro…ts, let us …rst focus on substitutable products case (i.e., > 0). The manufacturers' pro…ts increase under quantity discounts and two-part tari¤s relative to wholesale-price contracts when substitution is low (i.e., = 0:25 ). Furthermore, the manufacturers'pro…t increase is greater than the supply chain's pro…t increase, which means that the manufacturers are able to extract a higher share of the supply chain's pro…t. As product substitutability increases, the manufacturers'pro…ts are lower when they o¤er quantity discounts and two-part tari¤s and the magnitude of the loss can be as high as 44%. The pro…t loss for the manufacturers increase is higher with a more aggressive quantity discount (i.e., higher v) or a two-part tari¤. In those cases the e¤ect of more aggressive competition among the manufacturers dominates the e¤ect of increased supply chain pro…ts. As the level of economies of scale increases, the retailer bene…ts even more from the switch to sophisticated contracts and the manufacturers bene…t less. With a higher level of economies of scale, because the retailer has more incentive to consolidate its demand to one product, the competition becomes more intense and the retailer gains more power. In other words, the positive e¤ect of quantity discounts and two-part tari¤s on the manufacturers'pro…ts in the case of low substitutability diminishes with higher degree of economies of scale and the negative e¤ect in the case of high substitutability becomes more pronounced. For instance, with = 0:5 and v = 0:95 ( ) or two-part tari¤s, both the percentage of cases in which the manufacturers are worse o¤ and the average magnitude of the loss increase with K: Table 3 . Average percentage change in the supply chain, retailer and manufacturer profits in equilibrium under quantity-discount and two-part tariff contracts relative to the equilibrium under wholesale-price contracts. The retailer's pro…t decreases relative to the wholesale-price contracts only with two-part tari¤s and when substitutability is low. This is because manufacturers can extract rents well with two-part tari¤ contracts. (We would expect similar results for the quantity-discount contracts for lower than 0.177 based on Theorem 6.) Even with two-part tari¤s, the average change decreases (from -23.4% to -11.2%) as the level of economies of scale increases in the system. Higher substitutability and higher economies of scale endow the retailer with more power in the system, and the switch to more aggressive contracts is bene…cial for the retailer. As can be seen from low economies of scale and low substitution cases, the retailer may prefer less aggressive quantity discounts to the two-part tari¤s, because quantity discounts extract rents from the retailer less e¤ectively. For medium substitutability and low economies of scale cases, both the retailer and the manufacturers bene…t from the use of more sophisticated contracts relative to the wholesale-price contracts.
Our observations from the cases with complementary products is consistent with those with substitutable products. Because the retailer power diminishes with complementary products, the retailer's pro…t always decreases and the manufacturer pro…ts always increase with quantity discounts. Two-part tari¤s achieve both system coordination and full rent extraction in all cases.
In summary, the decisions for the two products are more tightly linked if they are close substitutes or the level of economies of scale is high. This increases the retailer's endogenous reservation pro…t and e¤ectively the retailer's power in its relation with each manufacturer. Our results suggest that the manufacturers are better o¤ employing the simple wholesale-price contracts when dealing with a powerful retailer rather than the more sophisticated quantity discounts or two-part tari¤s. When quantity discounts and two-part tari¤s are not very useful to the supply chain, because products are highly substitutable, they are particularly destructive for the manufacturers.
If they bene…t the supply chain substantially, then they are good for the manufacturers too.
Discussion
This paper is a …rst attempt to consider contracts other than wholesale-price contracts in systems with multiple competing manufacturers and a single common retailer. We demonstrate that, holding manufacturer B's contract o¤er …xed, manufacturer A can use a quantity discount or twopart tari¤ to improve supply chain performance and extract rents, as is known with contracting in supply chains with a monopolist manufacturer. However, when the manufacturers compete in the contract o¤ers, then we show that the manufacturers may be worse o¤ with quantity discounts or two-part tari¤s relative to wholesale-price contracts even though the supply chain can be better o¤. When downstream competition between the manufacturers is high, i.e., when the products are close substitutes, the retailer bene…ts considerably when the manufacturers compete with the more aggressive contracts, and the manufacturers are worse o¤. If the products are not close substitutes, then the retailer may be harmed by the more aggressive contracts and the manufacturers are better o¤, because the manufacturers are able to extract rent more e¤ectively. We …nd these e¤ects to be more signi…cant when the level of economies of scale at the retailer is high. In summary, when the products are close substitutes or the level of economies of scale at the retailer is high, the retailer's endogenous reservation pro…t (the value of the option to carry more of the competitor's product) increases and e¤ectively the retailer's power in its relation with each manufacturer. Our results suggest that the manufacturers are better o¤ employing the simple wholesale-price contracts in such cases rather than the more sophisticated quantity discounts or two-part tari¤s. While the retailer's preference is the reverse of the manufacturers'for low and high substitutability cases, all …rms prefer the more sophisticated contracts for a range of medium substitutability. Finally, unlike in serial supply chains and two competing supply chains with dedicated retailers, two-part tari¤s and quantity discounts are not equivalent from the manufacturers'and the retailer's perspectives because two-part tari¤s allow more rent extraction by the manufacturers at equilibrium. We conclude that it is important to study the properties of a contractual form in the presence of competition between manufacturers.
The prominence of wholesale-price contracts in practice and their widespread use in many industries, despite the fact that the manufacturers'optimal contract is usually a more sophisticated one, has been an open empirical question for researchers. One possible explanation has to do with the simplicity and lower implementation costs associated with wholesale-price contracts. Our results may provide another hypothesis to include in this discussion. The manufacturers in our model essentially face a prisoners'dilemma game -their best myopic action is always to o¤er the most aggressive contract, but this then leads to an equilibrium in which they are both worse o¤.
In a repeated game setting, it is well known that the players may be able to coordinate on the good outcome (o¤ering wholesale-price contracts when the products are close substitutes) by utilizing trigger strategies (defections are penalized by the other …rm for a limited number of periods) even though the bad outcome, o¤ering quantity-discount or two-part tari¤ contracts, is the Nash equilibrium in a single-shot game. It may be argued that the manufacturers have learned not to engage in actions that will trigger punishment, and hence choose wholesale-price contracts over more sophisticated contracts that are myopically optimal, but harmful at equilibrium. It will be interesting to test this hypothesis empirically by investigating which contract types are commonly used for various product groups with di¤erent levels of substitutability.
A quantity discount essentially reduces a retailer's marginal cost. Other contracts, such as buy-back and revenue-sharing contracts, have a similar e¤ect on the retailer. Thus, we suspect that similar results can be found for manufacturers competing with these contracts. That may require, however, retailer models that are di¤erent from ours, such as a model with inventory competition (i.e., substitution between products based on availability). While the particular retailer model we have worked with presents many technical di¢ culties in the presence of economies of scale, alternative models may not be less challenging. For the inventory competition model, the characterization of the best response of a manufacturer even in the simpler wholesale-price case can be achieved only under restrictive assumptions (see Kök 2003) . The derivation of the optimal wholesale-price contract with the method in Lariviere and Porteus (2001) is not possible because the retailer changes the quantities of both products in response to a change in the wholesale-price of one manufacturer. Finally, extension of this discussion to a setting with multiple common retailers or considering other forms of competition between manufacturers, such as based on product quality or assortment depth, may lead to richer and more complicated dynamics.
Appendix: Proofs
Theorem 1
Proof. The proof holds for general quantity discount contracts that satisfy
The quantity discount contract given by (2) satis…es these conditions. The proof consists of two steps. The …rst step proves that the retailer's problem would not admit more than one local
The second step characterizes each of the solutions
The proof of the …rst step is by contradiction. Suppose that there are two interior local maxima: (x 0 ; y 0 ) and (x 00 ; y 00 ) : The line that connects (x 0 ; y 0 ) and (x 00 ; y 00 ) can be characterized by (x 0 + t; y 0 + t) ; where = x 00 x 0 , = y 00 y 0 ; ; 2 <, t 2 [0; 1] represents the line segment between the two points, and t 2 < represents the whole line. De…ne (t) as the value of on that line,
We have,
Because (t) achieves local maxima at the points (x 0 ; y 0 ) and (y 0 ; x 0 ) ; we have 0 (t) = 0 and 00 (t) < 0 at these points. We now derive higher order derivatives:
Recall that 0 (t) = 0 and 00 (t) < 0 at t 2 f0; 1g: Given that (t) is continuous in t; this can only occur if there is at least one segment in t 2 [0; 1] such that 0 (t) is convex-concave, which requires that 000 (t) is decreasing along some segment. However, we have established that 000 (t) is increasing. Hence, a contradiction. It is easy to see that the pro…t function is convex-concave along the d i = 0 lines.
The second derivative is 
Lemma 1 Proof. First consider the retailer's problem under wholesale-price contracts from both manufacturers. We show that the Hessian is a negative semi-de…nite matrix, which guarantees joint concavity of the pro…t function. Note that (12) implies that
First, 4. Second, we show that the Hessian is a diagonally dominant matrix.
The proof of the case with quantity discount contracts is similar. To show diagonal dominance, we split the right-hand-side of the second derivatives to show ( ) > G 00 i and ( ) > T 00 i :
The former inequality holds by the condition (12) and the latter by (11).
Remark 1
Proof. Suppose manufacturer 1 o¤ers T 1 (d 1 ) and there exists a demand pair (d 0 1 ; d 0 2 ) such that
The …rst inequality is due to @R 0
decreasing: the retailer can always increase her revenue from product 2 by dropping product 1, and her payment to manufacturer 1 cannot increase. The second inequality follows by optimality of
Proposition 1 The proof follows from the proof of Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Among all quantity discounts that satisfy T 00 i (d i ) v i ; the dominant strategy for manufacturer i has the following functional form.
Thus, for given T j (d j ; w j ; v j ) and …xed v i ; the best response of manufacturer i is given by
Proof. Without loss of generality, let j = 2; and i = 1: Take any T 1 (d 1 ) and T 2 (d 2 ): Suppose that the retailer's optimal solution is an internal pointd = (d 1 ;d 2 ). (The proof is simpler if one ofd i is zero.) At the optimal solution the …rst order conditions are satis…ed: fH 1 = 0; H 2 = 0g :
We have T 0 1 (d 1 ) = : The optimal discount scheme for M1 among those that generated is the solution to
subject to H i (d) = 0; for i = 1; 2:
The constraints guarantee that both …rst order conditions are satis…ed at (d 1 ;d 2 ). The retailer function is jointly concave everywhere in the absence of economies of scale at the retailer as long this implies that
That is, the marginal cost to the retailer is decreasing as slowly as possible and equals atd: We
can be speci…ed in any way for d 1 >d 1 as long as it satis…es (15). We use the same functional form to specify T 0 1 (d 1 ) (which implies that T 00
to make sure that the argument applies to alld 1 . Another condition in (15) requires T 0 1 (d 1 ) c 1 .
T 0 1 is decreasing linearly in d 1 and it will reach c 1 at some …nite value. Rewriting T 0 1 , we replace v 1d1 + with w 1 to obtain,
Integrating T 0 and recalling the boundary value T (0) = 0 by (15), we obtain the quantity discount schedule
Note that this is not the optimal discount scheme over all possible discount schemes. It is the best scheme among the ones that produced: In other words, the functional form dominates other functional forms of T 1 (d 1 ): Thus, the optimal quantity discount scheme can be found by considering the functions of this type only. We will see in Theorem 2 that the constant part of T We show in the proof that i is concave in w i at the symmetric solution to the …rst order condition stated in the theorem. Hence, the solution is (at least) a local maximum.
Using the quadratic part of T i ; we obtain the …rst order condition for a manufacturer as follows.
Applying the Implicit Function Theorem on the retailer's …rst order conditions fH i = 0; for all ig, we can derive the impact of the wholesale prices on the optimal demand rates. De…ne
Note that > 0 because of the diagonal dominance of the Hessian as show in Lemma 1.
As expected, d i decreases with w i and increases with w j : The second derivative of i yields
which is negative when d 1 = d 2 ; because we have A 0 1 = A 0 2 and
Hence, the …rst order condition above has a unique solution when
satis…es the …rst and second order conditions for both manufacturers. That is, w i is a local maximum of i for …xed w j , and vice versa. If w i > w i ; then d 1 decreases and d 2 increases, A 0 i increases, A j increases, and A 0 j decreases, implying that @ 2 d i =@w 2 i remains negative. Hence, i is concave in w i for w i > w i for …xed w j . Thus, there can be no other local maximum greater than w i ; but a linear search in [w i ; w i ] is necessary to …nd the optimal wholesale price.
Theorem 1
Proof. The optimal demand rates can be solved as the unique solution to …rst order conditions fH i = 0; i = 1; 2g for given (w 1 ; w 2 ) : We have
and @ 2 d i =@w i @w j = 0; @d i =@w j = i + j = : Substituting these in the …rst order conditions in Theorem 2, we verify that the pro…t function of manufacturer i is concave in w i . This guarantees the existence of equilibria in the quantity discount game between the manufacturers. The best response w i (w j ) is the explicit solution to each …rst order condition. Di¤erentiating, we obtain
The second inequality is due to v i < 2 i i + j . Hence, we have increasing reaction functions with a slope less than 1. This implies that there is a unique equilibrium of the game between the manufacturers.
Theorem 4
Proof. The …rst part of the proof shows that for any set of contracts by the manufacturers, manufacturer i can do better by switching to a two-part tari¤ (F i ; c i ) : Let us focus without loss of generality on manufacturer 1. Let superscripts b and a denote the solutions before and after the contract change. Take any potential manufacturer equilibrium ( 
The …rst inequality is due to optimization, the equality because the payment to M1 has not changed, the second inequality from the optimality of d b 1 ; d b 2 before the contract change, and the last equality holds because the contract for product 2 has not been changed. Derivation of the pro…t expressions in Table 2 Total pro…t in the centralized system:
The optimal demand rates and the pro…t are as follows.
If only product i were carried, then
Equilibrium under two-part tari¤s:
By Theorem 4, manufacturer i 's optimal strategy is of a (F i ; c i ) type two-part tari¤. 
( + ) :
Equilibrium under quantity discount and wholesale-price contracts:
Based on the demand rates and reaction functions derived in Theorem 1, we can solve the equilibrium for the symmetric problem. Recall that 
Substituting v = 0 yields the equilibrium wholesale prices, and taking the limit as v ! 2 ( ) yields the equilibrium under the most aggressive quantity discounts.
At v = 0 :
As v ! 2 ( ) :
, w c = ( c) ( ) ( + ) , w = ( c) (2 ) ( + ) :
Similarly, the demand rates at the wholesale and the quantity discount rates are given by Manufacturer's pro…t at equilibrium is
At v = 0 : = ( c) 2 (2 ) ( ) ((2 + 2 ) (2 (2 ) 2 )) 2 = ( c) 2 ( ) ( ) 2 ( + ) (2 ) 2 :
As v ! 2 ( ) : = ( c) 2 (2 ) (( ) (2 )) ( (4 ) (2 ) Proof. Comparing the manufacturers' pro…t expressions given in Table 2 , we see that pro…ts under quantity discounts are always lower than those under two-part tari¤s because < ( + ) :
Pro…t under wholesale-price contracts is less than that under quantity discounts if and only if 2 ( + ) < (2 ) 2 ; which is equivalent to 0 < 2 2 6 + 2 : The right-hand-side is equal to 2 2 at = 0 and 3 2 at = ; and it is decreasing in between, crossing zero only once at 3 p 7 : Similarly, pro…t under wholesale-price contracts is less than that under two-part tari¤s if and only if 2 2 < (2 ) 2 ; which is equivalent to 0 < 2 2 4 + 2 : The right-hand-side is equal to 2 2 at = 0 and 2 at = ; and it is decreasing in between, crossing zero only once at 2 p 2 :
Theorem 6
Proof. Comparing the retailer's pro…t expressions given in Table 2 , we see that pro…ts under quantity discounts are always higher than those under two-part tari¤s because 2 > ( + ) :
Pro…t under wholesale-price contracts is less than that under quantity discounts if and only if 2 ( + ) 2 (2 ) 2 < 0: The left-hand-side is positive for all 0; it is equal to 0 at = ;
and it is convex in between, implying at most a single crossing point in (0; ) ; which would be the smallest root of this third-degree polynomial, i.e., Theorem 7 Consider the case of symmetric complementary products and no economies of scale.
Under quantity discounts as v goes to 2 ( + ), the equilibrium pro…t of a manufacturer is ( c) 2 =2 ( + ).
Under two-part tari¤ s, there are multiple equilibria where the manufacturer pro…ts are given by (^ 12 ^ 2 ;^ 2 ) or (^ 1 ;^ 12 ^ 1 ) ; or a linear combination of these points. The retailer pro…t is zero under both contracts.
Proof. For the quantity discount contract, substituting v = 2 ( + ) in equations (18) and (17) gives the pro…ts as stated. For the two-part tari¤ equilibrium, the equilibrium analysis of Theorem 4 needs to be revisited because with complementary products we have^ 12 >^ 1 +^ 2 . For any (F 1 ; c 1 ) ; (F 2 ; c 2 ); we have i = F i 1 fd i >0g ; and = max f^ 1 F 1 ;^ 2 F 2 ;^ 12 F 1 F 2 ; 0g : Let us focus on the response of manufacturer 1 (M1 
